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Bananas Left on Beach | HONDURAS' BANANA TRADE HISTORYCHAPTER III: EARLY DECISIONSShip manifests reveal some of the early decisions made by the family. While the Vaccaro brothers and the subsequent Standard Fruit and Steamship Company names are most closely associated with the banana business, the first cargos significantly emphasized other products. The chief item was coconuts, 150,000 to 200,000 per trip. Throughout the year 1899, oranges remained the second item in value, presumably because the Lousiana supply was destroyed, but also because the Vaccaros probably felt a bit more secure marketing a so much more familiar commodity. |
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Occasional plantains were brought to New Orleans too, but Salvador D'Antoni saw that even having the advantage of the relatively short run from Honduras to New Orleans, banana shipments of a few bananas usually arrived in good condition, but sometimes the voyage could be delayed in hot Honduran waters by problems in getting a full load, and tropical storms on the Gulf could easily add a week to the timetable. The total banana shipment could be lost. Yet no one was getting rich selling coconuts. The next gamble was inevitable. The partnership could continue to carry on with sailing ships for the coconut trade, but it would require the speed and dependability of steam for the banana.
Somehow the business grew. In the family partnership (most of the money was apparently Joseph Vaccaro's), written records were kept to a minimum, and even fewer remain today. But, external evidence indicates that the growth of sales in the first year or two was extremely rapid. While the little Santo Oteri, the only ship owned by the partners, continued its leisurely coconut-bearing voyages across the Gulf, the firm leased more and larger banana carriers every few months in 1900-1902. For example, Alliance, of Norwegian flag, entered the trade in March with an 8000-stem capacity; Bratten, (Norwegian) 16,000 stems, and Nicaragua, (Norwegian) 13,000 stems, both in January, 1901, Bergenseren, (Norwegian) 8,000 stems, and George Dumois (Norwegian) 10,000 stems, delivered to the Vaccaros in New Orleans on the same banner day, February 20, 1901; USK, (British) 16,000 stems, and Ely (British) 15,000 stems, both entered Vaccaro's service in December, 1901. In the following year, Gwent, (Norwegian) 10,000 stems, and David, American, consistently carrying a substantial 20,000 stems of bananas, add to the impressive evidence of growth. Finer and more numerous ships did not eliminate problems of transport, of course. Dating at least from 1890, banana importers faced ever-changing regulations concerning disease, and Southern ports occasionally imposed quarantines against ships from the tropics, often with no notice. Yellow fever was the recurring specter, expecially during the summer months. A fifteen day fumigation period whether imposed in New Orleans and Mobile or in Honduras made little difference - it usually caused the banana cargo to end up in the Mississippi River. Soon the shippers sought federal control over sanitary and health regulations at the ports because of local inconsistencies that would turn a ship away from New Orleans or Galveston but find it acceptable at Mobile. |
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Inconsistent, too, could be the Gulf winds, in 1900 or today. The first near disaster facing the Vaccaro ships occurred in March 1901, when the Nicaragua, sailing from British Honduras to New Orleans, drove onto a reef off Espiritu Santo on the Yucatan Coast. So savage were the waves that the crew required three days to launch a single lifeboat. Fortunately, all fifteen crewmen, the captain, his wife, and their nine-month old baby were rescued by another Vaccaro charter, the Bergenseren.
Innovation and free wheeling competition were evident on land as well. Prior to the beginning of this century, American banana firms neither bought nor leased banana growing acreage, but rather bought the produce from independent native growers, some of whom soon had substantial farms under cultivation. Since the banana can be harvested in any month, purchasing could be simple. Company representatives upon reaching Honduran waters dispatched messengers into the interior farms telling the growers that a ship would reach a certain costal site on a given day prepared for selection and purchase. One agent said that they walked around the beach and bought bananas from anybody who had them. Until the arrival of Salvador D'Antoni in Honduras, prices had always been determined by haggling right on the beach, growers and shippers alike, in a two way competition that could be ruinous. Salvador got his first buying experience on the Island of Roatan during his first visits with the Santo Oteri. The Englishman, Bill Collins was his tutor, training him how much should be paid for each stem. "I said...in this country, 8 hands, 9 hands are a bunch, seven are 2 for 1, 6 are 3 for 1, don't make any difference how big they are. So you see I inspected the first bunch of bananas this company ever bought". Collins, incidentally, also took credit for persuading Salvador to change his base of operations to the mainland of Honduras. Although his brother, Vicente D'Antoni remained for a few months on the islands purchasing coconuts, Salvador was convinced by then that the banana supply there was much too small and of poor quality. On the mainland their ship could be loaded with good fruit in one day. Strangely, growers prices varied little between the two locations. Collins understood this too, "And then I explained to him (Salvador) how the U.F. Company had bought out the Machecca and S. Oteri Companies and had sent a man named Walsh to tell the people that there would not be any more competition and that they would pay 25 cents a bunch of 8 hands or more delivered on board the ship. The people would not sell; some of the timid ones did, but the others cut the fruit to pieces before they would sell." Again in retrospect, it would not have been surprising if the partnership had been snuffed out before 1901, but banana consumption in the United States was becoming so vast around the turn of the century that some minor operations were bound to survive if they could manage to get the cooperation of a few growers. Many of the growers had been the recipients of shabby treatment by shippers and were eagerly seeking more reasonable relationships. Even more seriouos to the growers than low prices was the practice of some shippers, who ordered bananas far in excess of actual needs and then took only the best, starting for home when the ship was loaded, leaving thousands of reject items to rot on the beaches. D'Antoni concluded that the confidence of the growers would be his most important asset in developing a permanent business, so he instituted a policy of paying for whatever he ordered, whether it was loaded on board or not. This promise could be expensive and required careful knowledge of banana quality as well as the market, but in the long range it guaranteed the goodwill that D'Antoni sought, and the assurances of a steady supply of fruit. Some of D'Antoni's handicap of being a newcomer to the industry was lessened by the fact that the partnership could take advantage of known banana land. In the first five years or so of the twentieth century, the Republic of Honduras moved into first place in the world's production of bananas, a position it was to hold for most of the next fifty years. Substantial rainfall, a warm climate without frosts, and fine, sandy loam soil with good drainage all early recognized as necessary for cultivation of the crop, were available throughout thousands of acres on the nothern coast of Honduras. | ||||||
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A strip of land almost two hundred miles long and stretching inland from the Caribbean an average of some forty miles in depth provided the region of most intense production. From Tela westward to the vicinity of the Guatemala border, United Fruit and William Streich's Cuyamel Company pretty well controlled fruit purchases and handily discouraged competitors. Leaving something of a neutral ground in between United and his own purchases, D'Antoni rapidly expanded the partnership's interests to the eastward, tending to concentrate his activities among growers surrounding the villages of El Porvenir, La Ceiba, and Balfate. Nowhere in this new zone of influence existed anything resembling a harbor, thus ship loading created unique problems. Hondurans, men, women, and children waded from shore, carrying each stem of bananas high overhead to avoid the salt water, then placing it gently in long lighters. When the lighters were filled, they were poled by crewmen beyond the breakers to the steamer, or in some instances, to the ship's boat which could tow several lighters the remaining distance. The final loading aboard ship was accomplished by rope nets that would settle the green gold into the hold. Often the work had to be done at night when the winds eased, meaning extra costs, and once resulting in D'Antoni's arrest for violating local regulations. When Collins pointed out to his friend, the port Commandant, that United Fruit could load after the port closed, the same permission was henceforth granted to D'Antoni. Traditionally, because the banana could be grown so easily and cheaply, such primitive conditions with their attendant loss and spoilage on a grand scale were accepted facts of life in Honduras. This held as true on the farms in the cutting and in delivery to the beaches, as in the loading of the ships. The possibility of loss stayed with the fruit to New Orleans. Deck loading was condemned, but was nevertheless common, and probably no more damaging than some of the procedures for getting the stems in and out of the hold. Steamer delivery provided a more regular and prompt system, but much could still go wrong on the so called "hot boats" of those days, unusual heat waves (some companies did not ship to Gulf ports at all during July and August), prolonged quarantines, and delays in marketing and delivering within the United States. These problems required years for solution; profits might meanwhile be significant, but a stable industry needed revolutionary changes in techniques. However keen the rivalry between companies, it is apparent that each took advantage of improvements made by the other. A small head start could make the difference between a good and a bad year. | ||||||
| To meet these challenges, the Vaccaro D'Antoni partnership first called upon family help. Salvador D'Antoni moved permanently to Honduras, ultimately with his office at La Ceiba, and became general manager of the Honduran activities. Assisting him were: his brother, Vicente, moving over from the Bay Islands, but still supervising coconut production; his brother Joseph; and brother Carmelo, fresh out of the Italian navy and soon to develop a flair for finance. The older Vaccaros managed the company from New Orleans. Luca and Felix supervised the complexities of the domestic marketing system, while Joseph, the planner and dreamer, coordinated the whole endeavor, President obviously, though he and the rest all eschewed business titles.
This large family made possible distribution of labor, and by 1902, expansion in Honduras was underway. The partnership could now supervise more agents like Collins, to roam farther into the interior for banana purchases and give consideration to expediting delivery through clearing rivers and possibly building a small rail line. Meanwhile, the Republic of Honduras began playing a larger role in regulating this purchase and exportation of its produce. After sending delegates to the Pan American Exposition at Buffalo in 1901, the Honduran government reported that delegates were much impressed with the efficiency of United States agriculture, and the Minister of Interior prepared a special "Memoria" on the matter of increasing the nation's agricultural exports. The conclusion reached was that the banana was the most suitable item of export, already returning nearly two million dollars per year to the growers (almost all of whom were natives) and that to expand productivity and increase this revenue, more foreign capital and technicians must be introduced. No change in policy came with the election of President Manuel Bonilla in 1903, evidence of which can be seen in a number of Decrees granted by the government to foreigners in the ensuing months. . The Compania Industrial Ceibena (C.I.C.) a Honduran firm, was organized by Augustin Disdier for the purpose of developing a fresh water supply as well as electricity for the growing village of La Ceiba. The firm's by-laws were approved in May of 1902, and its original stockholders were:
Of these stockholders, 7 were French, 7 were Honduran, 2 were American, 2 were Italian, 1 was Cuban and 1 was Spanish. This group of stockholders gives a fairly accurate picture of the number and diversity of foreigners in and near La Ceiba at the turn of the century. A census taken around 1898 gave the Municipality of La Ceiba a population of 3,362. By executive Decree No. 53, dated February 28, 1903, the C.I.C. was given a concession to build and operate a water supply system, an electric light plant, an ice manufacturing plant and a soft drinks bottling plant. The concessionaire Decrees pouring out of Tegucigalpa from 1903 not only indicate that the government had decided that foreign investment was essential and not dangerous, they also demonstrate that the banana companies had concluded that their participation in Honduras would be permanent. In retrospect, this decision seems obvious, but in 1903 it meant a significant change in policy, especially for the older companies. Substantial profits had accrued to Machecca, Oteri, United, and others by the simple expedient or minimizing costs of production and building larger and larger fleets that could swoop into an area and clean out the bananas when price and quality suited the shipper, and not necessarily the growers. (This policy worked less well in Costa Rica where United had to maintain some profit system for founder Minor C. Keith's railroad). Honduras, with literally hundreds of growers, seemed perfectly designed for the Yankee to buy and run when he saw fit. But world competition could not permit this extravagance long. Ship owners could not continually gamble with the possibility of empty holds, owned or leased, nor could they expect continued loyalty from growers who had been two or three times spurned. Successful big business required established procedures, steady not phenomenal growth, and an attitude of permanence. In short, the banana company was to homestead in Honduras, and Honduras expected to increase directly its favorable balance of trade that the banana and, to a lesser extent, that minerals gave. Continue on to CHAPTER IV: GROWING UP IN THE BANANA TRADE Return to CHAPTER II: ENTERING THE BANANA TRADE Return to CHAPTER I: THE BEGINNING OF STANDARD FRUIT COMPANY 
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Written by J.P. Sanchez, La Ceiba Honduras.
This online book is copyrighted and property of LaCeiba.com. Any reproduction in whole or in part is strictly prohibited.
This Perspective of
Honduras' Banana Trade is the Author's. The Opinions Therein
Do Not Necessarily Reflect Those of LaCeiba.com Management.